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1603ko batasunaren ezaugarriak teorian –itun bidez– eta praktikan finkat zen siat zean 
sortu ziren berehalako arazoak aztertuko dira kapitulu honetan. Horrez gain, nortasun nazionalen 
arazoa, Eskoziaren eta Ingalaterraren arteko harreman hot zen historia eta Erreforma protestanteak 
bi herrialdeetan izandako eragina ere aztertuko da.
Gilt za-Hit zak: Batasuna. Itunak. Nazio nortasuna. Hizkunt za. Harreman anglo-eskoziarrak. 
Dinastiak. Erreforma. Monarkia anizkuna.
Este capítulo analiza los problemas inmediatos que se presentan a la hora de intentar 
establecer la naturaleza de la unión de 1603 en la teoría –mediante tratados– y en la práctica. 
Asimismo, estudia el problema de las identidades nacionales, la historia de relaciones hostiles 
entre Escocia e Inglaterra y el impacto de la Reforma protestante en ambos países.
Palabras Clave: Unión. Tratados. Identidad nacional. Lenguaje. Relaciones anglo-escocesas. 
Dinastías. Reforma. Monarquía múltiple.
Ce chapitre aborde les problèmes immédiat s auxquels on se heurte lorsque l’on essaie 
d’établir la nature de l’Union de 1603 dans la théorie – à l’aide des Traités – et dans la pratique. 
Il analyse également le problème des identités nationales, l’histoire des relations hostiles entre 
l’Écosse et l’Angleterre et l’impact de la Réforme protestante dans les deux pays. 
Mot s Clé : Union. Traités. Identité nationale. Langage. Relations anglo-écossaises. Dynasties. 
Réforme. Monarchie multiple. 
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The reason for choosing this title, a saying of James VI and I, is because 
of the appeal of Professor Albaladejo’s title ‘Union of Souls, Autonomy of 
Bodies’, which suggest s a very fruitful approach to the subject of union. King 
James might have added ‘souls’, although, as I will suggest, there was a 
very good reason why he did not. And preserving the autonomy of the bod-
ies of his Scottish and English subject s was a highly problematic matter, 
one which brought the king and the subject s of both his realms into conflict 
and collision, largely because no-one in 1603 really knew what the addi-
tion of Scotland to the composite monarchy of England, Ireland and Wales 
would entail; it was easier to say what was not wanted than what was, and 
shrill complaint s by the Scot s and the English were much more loudly heard 
than any positive comment or clear thinking about how the union might work. 
The famous antiquary Sir Robert Cotton produced a treatise two days after 
James’s accession to the English throne, showing the way in which through-
out history smaller kingdoms had come together to form larger ones; thus 
he argued that what was happening in 1603 was exactly part of that process 
whereby the kingdoms of Scotland and England had come into existence. And 
this new kingdom needed a name; what better than Roman Britannia?1 It may 
have been historically accurate, as an account of kingdom-formation in medi-
eval Europe. Politically, in 1603, it offered no solution at all.
Nor did the flood of tract s poured out on the subject between 1603 and 
1605. They were written with a wealth of scholarship, looking not only to the 
histories of kingdoms in the past, especially Scotland and England, but to 
models of composite kingdoms in the present, in particular the Spanish mon-
archia, and they were more or less welcoming of the union. But they never 
actually suggested any practical answer to the burning question of how this 
particular union would work. They are extremely interesting, a very good guide 
to contemporary views of early-modern multiple monarchies. Nevertheless, 
pared down to the Anglo-Scottish context, perhaps the greatest guide they 
give about what was going to happen now that James VI had become James 
VI and I can be found in the hint s, in the Scottish tract s, of fear of neglect, 
and in the English, of innate superiority; the Scottish Robert Pont and John 
Russell point to the first, the English Sir Henry Spelman, to the second, while 
Sir Henry Savile –whose tract ends delightfully on the note that ‘I have raved 
enough and too much’– referred to Scotland’s historical state of vassalage 
to England, even if he did not labour the point as far as the new union was 
concerned2. And what is noteworthy about them is how short-lived was the 
genre; one of the tract s was written in 1603, a few in 1605, but the great 
majority were composed in 1604, the year of James’s first English parliament 
when MPs were already showing considerable anxiety about, even hostility 
to, the possible implications of union. Thereafter, there was no interest in 
theoretic or ideological discussion of union. Instead, Anglo-Scottish bicker-
1. National Archives, London, SP 14/1/3, ‘A Discourse of the Descent of the K’s Mty from 
the Saxons’.
2. GALLOWAY, Bruce R. and LEVACK, Brian P., eds, The Jacobean Union: Six tract s of 1604, 
Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1985; see, for example; pp. 28, 102, 162, 190-2, 239.
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ing and brawling, the killing off of the more incorporating union talked about 
by the king by the English parliament in 1607 and the now openly expressed 
fears of English domination articulated by the Scottish parliament of the 
same year, and evidence of continuing mutual dislike, were to be the charac-
teristics of the Anglo-Scottish union in it s early years. And in the seventeenth 
century as a whole, the nature of royal authority, tyranny, republicanism, were 
what exercised the minds of the scholars and political theorist s and lawyers 
of the age. Union was not of interest, and would not become so again until 
the early eighteenth century, when the issue of what would in 1707 become 
the union of the parliament s was becoming ever more contentious; only then 
did it once more become a central issue in the parliament s of England and 
Scotland, and men turned to the writing of tract s about it. There is, therefore, 
a problem.
Because union became a ‘fact’ in 1603, and has remained a ‘fact’ for 
the next four centuries, it is all too tempting to assume that it had a kind 
of inevitability, even that it was desired. Lack of interest in the concept and 
nature of union, after the first two years, and the preference for refusing to 
contemplate possible development s beyond the ramshackle unity vested only 
in the person of the king, suggest s something very different. In other words, 
far from thinking that the union of 1603 was welcomed, it appears that the 
very reverse was the case. James’s union of heart s and minds was no doubt 
a lovely aspiration, but it was very wide of the mark. And perhaps we should 
not be surprised; for even after 400 years it can hardly be said to exist today. 
The annual series of Anglo-Scottish football matches was begun in the nine-
teenth century and discontinued in the late twentieth, simply because of the 
excessive violence which accompanied them; and the famous billboard on 
the occasion of the match in London in 1975 which proclaimed ‘Lock up your 
daughters: the Jocks (Scot s) are coming’ did rather suggest that attitudes 
had hardly changed since the middle ages. More recently, in 2003, in a 
political discussion programme on the BBC, the MP Diane Abbott commented 
on the number of Scottish MPS in the Labour Government, and referred to 
their curious Scottish bloodfeuds which complicated government business.. 
Understandably enough, she showed little awareness of the historic nature of 
the feud in Scottish society; rather, she was introducing a topos to underline 
her critical view that there were too many Scot s in high places in the British 
parliament. This of course linked in with mounting English unease about the 
impact of devolution after 1999 in Scotland and Wales, an unease felt more 
keenly about the Scottish parliament than the Welsh assembly with it s more 
restricted powers; now, MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) could 
legislate on Scottish matters, while Scottish MPs sitting in Westminster 
could vote on bills concerned only with English ones, and indeed on occa-
sion ensure the government’s success in getting them through. The Scottish 
response, far from acknowledging that there was indeed a problem here, 
tended to concentrate on pointing out that the Scot s had been dominated by 
the English for long enough, which was emotional rather than helpful. And this 
issue, known as the ‘West Lothian question’, remains as contentious and as 
unresolved as constitutional debates at the time of the union of 1603. It led 
to remarkably out spoken comment, when the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
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was known to be going in 2007, about the problem of Gordon Brown’s suc-
ceeding him, because he was a Scot; and to that outrage was added the fur-
ther one that so, at that time, was the Leader of the Liberal Democrat party, 
Menzies Campbell. These are all things which indicate that four hundred 
years after the Union of the Crowns, the Scot s and the English –and, for that 
matter, the Irish and the Welsh– still do not sit comfortably together, still do 
not wholly understand one another.
This does not mean, of course, that the union is clearly crumbling. 
Despite the rise of the Scottish National Party in the later twentieth century 
and it s remarkable success in the Scottish election of 2007, there is by no 
means strong support for it s dream of independence. Whatever the future, 
we are currently living through a historical phase of union; and there have 
been different phases at different times. After their horrified reaction at and 
rejection of James’s proposal to call himself king of Great Britain, thus mar-
ginalising the name of England, in the long run the English resolved the prob-
lem by using ‘England’ interchangeably with ‘Britain’. Indeed, there is a very 
early example of this. On 2 April 1605, Francis Bacon wrote to lord chancellor 
Ellesmere, advocating a history of Britain. Ellesmere duly endorsed the let-
ter: ‘Sir Francis Bacon touching the Story of England’3. The Scot s, in periods 
when union was working to their advantage –the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries– did show some touchiness about their Scottishness, but were per-
fectly happy to regard themselves as ‘North Britons’, apparently not too dis-
turbed by the fact that the English never called themselves ‘South Britons’. It 
may be possible, therefore, to regard the union, whether of the crowns or the 
parliament s, as something of a success, at least at a pragmatic and political 
level, or perhaps at the level of inertia or even of fear of change. That still 
leaves the question why it was and is little more than that, why, socially and 
culturally, it has never put down deep root s.
To put the question in a different form, why have national identities 
proved so exceedingly durable? Is it possible to impose a supra-national 
identity on two peoples with very different self-perceptions and histories 
–and to that can, of course, be added Ireland and Wales. Indeed, even the 
phrase ‘national’ identity may be an over-simplification. Cotton’s argument 
that the union of the crowns was an example of smaller kingdoms coming 
together as greater ones not only does not work in terms of the creation of 
‘Britannia’, but hardly works for Scotland; do highland and lowland Scotland 
really constitute a nation? In the early seventeenth century, manifestly they 
did not. Hostility between highlands and lowlands was already detectable by 
the end of the fourteenth century, when the chronicler John of Fordun drew 
a distinction between the civilised and trustworthy lowlanders, and the wild 
and thieving highlanders4, and by the time of the union, that hostility had 
markedly increased. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, this was 
3. Huntington Library, San Marino, California, Ellesmere Papers EL 128.
4. SKENE, W. F., ed. Johannis de Fordun Chronica Gentis Scotorum, Edinburgh: Edmonton and 
Douglas, 1871-2, ii; p. 38.
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made worse by king James, the one man who had a real interest in creating 
some measure of supra-national identity. His case for adopting the name of 
‘Great Britain’, set out in his proclamation of 1604, put great emphasis on 
what Scotland and England had in common, with ‘A communitie of language, 
the principall meanes of Civil societie, An unitie of Religion, the chiefest band 
of heartie Union, and the surest knot of lasting Peace’; the argument was 
distinctly weakened, when a sizeable number of his Scottish subject s spoke 
Gaelic5. Hence, by the Statutes of Iona of 1609, it was enjoined on clan 
chiefs that they must send their eldest sons to the lowlands for their educa-
tion, and that they themselves must appear before the privy council at stated 
intervals; and in 1616, the statutes were re-issued, with the additional insist-
ence that no-one could inherit property in the Western Isles unless he could 
speak, read and write English6. He had also, anticipating his policy of the 
plantation of Ulster, attempted two plantations of Lewis, sending men from 
Fife to settle and civilise the island, in 1602 and 1606; both were disastrous, 
many of the gentlemen adventurers being killed, which makes it perhaps sur-
prising that as king of England James should extend his plantation policy to 
Ulster which began in 1609. The king who sought to unite the kingdoms of 
Scotland and England was therefore the king who largely failed to unite the 
two cultures of his Scottish kingdom.
This was much more, however, than an English-Gaelic problem. In terms 
of community of language, the English may not have met Gaelic-speaking 
Scot s, but they did acquire a king who, though Anglicizing the lowland Scot s 
–a dialect of northern English– which had been his language for the first thirty-
five years of his life, spoke it with a Scottish accent. Indeed, it seems likely 
that while his writings were Anglicized, he retained Scot s in ordinary usage, 
if not in his formal addresses; Francis Bacon described his speech as ‘swift 
and cursory and in the full dialect of his country’. That this was the case is 
supported by the sour comment by Sir Thomas Howard in 1611 that James 
should not only teach Latin to his favourite Robert Ker, but ‘I think someone 
should teach him English too; for as he is a Scottish lad, he hath much need 
of better language’7. At court and in the city of London, therefore, any pos-
sible union of heart s and minds was threatened by the sheer presence of a 
Scottish king and his Scottish entourage in an English court already becom-
ing conscious of the correct way of speaking; not only did the English have to 
listen to Scottish accent s, but it may even be that they could have consider-
able difficulty in understanding what was said. Difficulty in communicating is 
a perhaps neglected but extremely important matter, when trying to assess 
the acceptability of union.
5. LARKIN, James F.; HUGHES, Paul L. eds, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 1603-1525, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973; p. 95.
6. DONALDSON, Gordon. Scotland: James V to James VII, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965; 
p. 231.
7. Bacon is quoted by WILLSON, David H. King James VI and I, London: Jonathan Cape, 1956. 
p. 166. For Howard, ASHTON, Robert. James I by his Contemporaries, London: Hutchinson, 1969; 
p. 238.
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More generally, 1603 was not actually an auspicious moment for bringing 
Scotland and England together in harmony, for both immediate and longer-
term reasons. If the Scot s and the English are uneasy with one another today, 
how much more was that the case at the time of the union of the crowns. At 
a superficial level, it might appear that for the first time for over three hun-
dred years, there was some chance of friendship. Much has been made of 
the fact that both were now protestant countries, thus drawn together in the 
interest s of mutual defence against the great Catholic powers of France and 
Spain. This was certainly in English interest s, and to an extent it was shared 
by leading Scottish protestant s who, from the time of their reformation in 
1559-60, had sought closer ties with England; and ultimately this was for-
malized in the Anglo-Scottish Amity of 1586. But the Scottish approach was, 
as so often, more pragmatic than the English; in 1559-60, it s protestant s 
needed English support to overset the control of the queen regent, the 
Catholic Mary of Guise, with her French troops and officials in Scotland, and 
break the ‘Auld Alliance’ with France, that alliance first established in 1295, 
and now reinforced by the marriage of Mary queen of Scot s to the French 
king François II. But with Mary of Guise’s death, the French driven out, and 
the death of François in the second half of 1560, the English became less of 
a practical necessity. For the Scot s, with a more realistic view of it s place in 
Europe, did not endlessly fear a coalition of these powers against their here-
tic kingdom, as the English did about theirs. England’s traditional enemy had 
been France, her new and ever-menacing one Spain, and after living through 
three worried decades, Elizabeth’s intervention in the Netherlands forced 
Philip II to do what the English had all along anticipated, and move against 
England. The stunning defeat of the Armada in 1588 was one of the glorious 
moment s of English history, but it was anything but decisive, and a much less 
glorious Anglo-Spanish war, which certainly tarnished that moment, and led to 
the renewed fears and worries of the 1590s, dragged on for the remainder of 
Elizabeth’s reign. It is a telling comment on the difference between Scottish 
and English fears that when, on her death, her greatest servant Sir Robert 
Cecil was able to think about negotiating peace, the new king enthusiastically 
agreed with him, on the grounds that as king of Scotland he had not been at 
war with Spain and he saw no reason why as king of England he should be. 
The difference between the two kingdoms, therefore, do not provide grounds 
for seeing union between them as the next logical step. And even allowing for 
the degree of common cause created by their change in religion means no 
more than that there were new reasons for alliance between them in place of 
the former enmity; it did not require union.
Indeed, far from it. By 1603, there had been less than two genera-
tions of protestant s in Scotland and England (for as English reformation 
historians now argue, England did not become a protestant nation until 
Elizabeth’s reign). That was pathetically little to set against three centuries 
of Anglo-Scottish enmity. As late as the 1540s, the decade of the last of the 
Anglo-Scottish wars which, if intermittent rather than regular after the late 
fourteenth century, had characterized relations between the two kingdoms, 
the Scot s were still referring to the English as the ‘auld inemie’ (old enemy). 
Before the last decades of the sixteenth century, the only writer to urge an 
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advantage in friendship between two neighbouring countries was the great 
scholar John Mair, in his Historia Majoris Britanniae of 1521, and he got lit-
tle credit for it in his own nation8. But there was more to it than accepted 
habit of mind. There was an extraordinary imbalance. Medieval England had 
annexed Wales, had set it s imperialist sight s on Ireland and established 
a base there even if, by distracting it self with other ambitions, it failed to 
extend it s control, thus creating a very long term and peculiarly intractable 
problem; and it had turned it s attention to Scotland. The root s of a ‘union’ 
of the kingdoms of the British Isles therefore lay in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, a ‘union’ presided over by the king of England. At the same time, 
the English crown had extensive interest s in France; and from the 1330s, it s 
French involvement escalated into the claim for the French crown, pushed by 
Edward III, Henry V, and disastrously in the name of the wretched Henry VI. 
Not until the seventeenth century did the concept of the national economy 
begin to develop, and men begin to think about what the nation could sustain; 
previously kings with grandiose schemes assumed that resources would be 
found, with sometimes spectacular result s, as in the bankruptcies of Charles 
V and Philip II –or the pawning of the crown of England by Edward III. There 
was, however, one striking difference: Charles and Philip had a sense of mis-
sion as well as territorial ambition which was wholly lacking in the territorial 
aggression of medieval English kings. As far as England is concerned, it is 
not so much the historian’s job to ask how could a comparatively small king-
dom dream of conquest on such a scale, but rather what was the effect on a 
kingdom which could sustain such dreams when it failed. Ultimate defeat in 
the Hundred Years War –strictly 120 years– against a major enemy, France, 
was bad enough. But what of defeat against a very minor one, Scotland, 
and in a much shorter time scale, for apart from a brief period in the early 
1330s, the only time when conquest might have been feasible was the reign 
of Edward I. And even in that short period, the Scot s displayed a remarkable 
awareness of a concept of national identity; in Edward’s particularly brutal 
siege of Stirling castle in 1304, at a time when there was no king of Scot s, 
the Scot s rallied to their symbol, the Lion, flying the Lion flag defiantly over 
the battlement s of the castle, a concept which the Scottish poet s and chroni-
clers of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, John Barbour, Andrew of 
Wyntoun, Walter Bower and Blind Hary, would do much to encourage.
By the mid-fifteenth century, therefore, the dream of conquest of Scotland 
had become the nightmare of failure, and now it was the same with the 
French. England was no longer a dominant European power, but an offshore 
kingdom, larger and richer than Scotland, but in much the same position. The 
bombastic Henry VIII –Henry V redivivus– did his best to insist on England’s 
pre-eminent position in Europe, and –as Edward I redivivus– renewed the idea 
of annexing Scotland, carefully digging out old claims of English overlordship. 
Neither was successful. Foreign observers –a Venetian ambassador, the 
Scot John Mair– began to draw attention to England’s need to assert English 
8. MAJOR, John. A History of Greater Britain, ed. CONSTABLE, Archibald, Edinburgh: Scottish 
History Society, 1892.
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superiority; ‘’if, in a foreign land’, wrote Mair, ‘they happen upon a man of 
part s and spirit, ‘tis pity’, they say, ‘he’s not an Englishman’. But Mair went 
on to talk about the Scot s’ reputation for pride: ‘the French have a proverb 
about the Scot s to this effect... The man is as proud as a Scot’9. Even the 
towering figure of Erasmus offers a similar kind of comment; ‘Just as Nature 
has implanted his personal self-love in each individual person’, he wrote, 
‘I can see she has put a sort of communal variety in every nation and city. 
Consequently the British think they have a monopoly, among other things, 
of good looks, musical talent and fine food. The Scot s pride themselves 
on their nobility and the distinction of their royal connections as much as 
on their subtlety in dialectic’10. This is a very interesting, and puzzling pas-
sage. At first sight, it looks as though this is a very early example of using 
of ‘British’ for ‘English’. But Erasmus knew perfectly well what ‘England’ and 
the ‘English’ were, and it is possible that he was indeed meaning ‘British’ 
–even, unlikely as it may seem, possibly the Welsh11. That would help to 
explain why, despite his intellectual contact s with English humanist s, he says 
nothing about that here. His list ranges from British and Scot s to the French 
and Italians, and then goes on to eastern nations before coming back to the 
Spaniards and Germans, about whom he is fairly dismissive. Only the Scot s 
and the French are singled out for academic prowess.
Early sixteenth century Scotland was therefore being given more attention 
by contemporaries than by later historians, and characterized in a very posi-
tive way, whereas for the English there was the desire to conceal fears about 
loss of European place. And indeed in this period both themes are evident. 
When he came to the throne in 1509, desperate to mark himself out as one 
of the greatest of European monarchs, Henry VIII had to face the bitter fact 
that renaissance culture was shining much more brightly in the court of his 
Scottish neighbour, James IV, than in his own, for it was James who presided 
over a distinguished circle of court poet s while for Henry in his first two dec-
ades there was real paucity of talent. James IV even built a bigger ship, the 
Great Michael, than Henry had, and Henry had to put his shipbuilders to work 
to match it. English kings were not used to finding that in the rivalry between 
kings seeking to out shine one another in power and in culture the Scottish 
king was well in competition. And it was not only Henry who noticed. In 1504, 
pope Julius II listed the rulers of western Europe in order of importance, both 
England and Scotland were in the middle rank, with England only two places 
above Scotland. Durer’s design for the triumphal arch commissioned in 1515 
by the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian, which displayed the twelve Caesars 
on the left and, on the right, twelve contemporary monarchs, put the Scottish 
9. MAJOR, History; pp. 27, 43.
10. ERASMUS. In raise of Folly, eds RADICE, Betty and LEVI, A.H.T., Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1971; pp. 132-3.
11. Gerald of Wales certainly thought of the Welsh as a people of ‘musical talent and fine 
food’. I am grateful to Professor Roger Major for discussion of this passage, and for this sugges-
tion, though as he rightly emphasises, it is only a suggestion.
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king along with the kings of France and England12. For his first marriage alli-
ance, he married his son and heir Arthur to the daughter of Ferdinand and 
Isabella of Aragon and Castile, Katherine of Aragon. For his second, in 1503, 
he married his elder daughter Margaret to James IV of Scotland –the mar-
riage which would, exactly a century later, bring their descendant James VI to 
the throne of England. Socially, intellectually and politically, Scotland was of 
greater importance than it had been, while England had lost it s late-medieval 
dominance.
And as the sixteenth century progressed, there was little to reassure the 
English that they were, as they wanted to believe, and had, with some justifi-
cation, believed in the past, that they stood far above the kingdom of Scot s, 
however much they might remind themselves of the barbarity and poverty 
of the Scot s compared to the civilization and wealth of the English. There 
was an endless series of pinpricks, and more than pinpricks. In the 1530s, 
James V successfully resisted Henry VIII’s bullying to join him in breaking with 
Rome, and by so doing made himself an attractive prospect in the European 
marriage market, in which he was much more successful than the English 
king. After his divorce from Katherine, Henry settled down to his series of 
four English brides and one minor German princess. James was wooed by 
the pope and by Charles V, and married first the daughter of the French 
king François Ier, and then, when she died, a member of one of the greatest 
aristocratic houses of Europe, Marie de Guise –the lady sought in marriage 
by Henry himself, who reputedly rejected him on the grounds that she might 
be large in person, but she had a little neck (a reference to the fate of Anne 
Boleyn). Less dramatically, but equally offensively, when, in 1541, Henry 
proposed a meeting with James and moved his by then vast bulk north to 
York, James failed to turn up. Confidence and insouciance on the part of the 
Scottish king, frustration and fury on the part of the English, did nothing to 
sweeten Anglo-Scottish relations nor weaken long-ingrained hostility; all that 
was happening was that try as they might the English were no longer so able 
to look down on the Scot s.
That continued even when the balance of the relationship between 
Scotland and England appeared to alter dramatically, in favour of the latter, 
with the English defeat of the Scot s at the battle of Solway Moss in November 
1542 and James V’s death, at the early age of thirty, three weeks later; his 
heir was his week-old daughter, Mary. Henry immediately seized the chance 
to create a union of sort s, by proposing the marriage of that daughter to his 
son Edward, though annexation of rather than union with Scotland is probably 
the more accurate way to describe it, for Henry was reviving the old medi-
eval claims to English overlordship of Scotland. When diplomacy failed, Henry 
turned to war, the savage and brutal so-called ‘Rough Wooing’. His experience 
was no different from that of the Romans, or of Edward I; it was possible to 
overrun southern and central Scotland, but impossible to get further. After his 
12. MACDONALD, Alastair A. ‘Chivalry as a Catalyst of Cultural Change in late-Medieval Scot-
land’, in SUNTRUP, Rudolf and VEENSTRA, Jan R., eds, Tradition und Innovation im Ubergang zur 
Freuhen Neuzeit, Frankfurt am Main: 2001; pp. 173.
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death, the duke of Somerset, regent for the young Edward VI, continued the 
Rough Wooing, winning a stunning battle at Pinkie in September 1547, but 
failing to win the war. Yet Somerset, carefully adopting less bullying tactics 
than Henry, might have had something to offer. He very carefully urged a union 
of England and Scotland as two equal realms. And his Scottish policy was 
not only military but missionary; he was trying to encourage the flourishing of 
protestantism in Scotland. He failed. Memories of English aggression were 
too forcibly revived, and Scotland turned back to her old ally, France. Once 
again, English military might, and even a new form of English blandishment, 
had failed to bring Scotland into the English hegemony. And it might be added 
here that although when English and Scottish armies met in major battles, the 
English almost always won, as they did at Neville’s Cross in 1346, Flodden 
in 1513, Solway and Pinkie, none of these battles was decisive, any more 
than the great military icons of Agincourt and the Armada were decisive. Only 
the Scot s could claim a battle which did decide the outcome: their one great 
victory over the English at Bannockburn in 1314. None of this did anything to 
boost the morale of the English kingdom; having lost their position in Europe 
after their defeat in France, they still could not even conquer Scotland. 
As it would turn out, the dynastic union of the crowns was now just 
over half a century in the future. But in the mid-sixteenth century, relations 
between England and Scotland seemed to have made little progress beyond 
what they had been some two and a half centuries in the past, and that 
despite the new and dramatic element in the equation, religious reform. 
Traditionally, England was thought to have moved towards reform well before 
Scotland, with the Henrician reformation, limited though it was, and the move 
towards a more protestant position in the brief reign of Edward VI, which 
would flourish under Elizabeth after the equally brief reign of the Catholic 
Mary Tudor. Scotland, by contrast, remained Catholic until Elizabeth’s acces-
sion in November 1558 gave Scottish protestant s their opportunity; in 1559, 
the protestant party began to make advances, and in 1560, success came 
with a rush, made possible by English military intervention in the summer 
of that year. This broke England’s short-lived ties to Spain, created by the 
marriage of Mary and Philip, and the much longer ties between Scotland and 
France, especially when Mary queen of Scot s’ French husband François II 
died in December 1560 and Mary herself, now obsessed with her self-pro-
claimed right of succession to the English crown, returned to Scotland in 
August 1561. The diplomatic as well as the religious map of Spain, France 
and the kingdoms of England and Scotland had, it seemed, changed dramati-
cally. There was now every reason for alliance between England and Scotland, 
and perhaps even more than that. Even before Mary turned her attention to 
Elizabeth’s throne, Somerset’s idea of union had crept back onto the agenda; 
Elizabeth’s greatest minister, William Cecil, was hinting, if in a sotto voce 
way, at the advantage of Elizabeth becoming queen of a united England and 
Scotland, should Mary’s poor health lead conveniently to her death, or if the 
Scottish protestant lords should depose her13. But the Scottish protestant s, 
13. ALFORD, Stephen. The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession 
Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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while they might welcome help from England, and would almost certainly 
have preferred Mary to remain in France while they advanced God’s cause 
in Scotland, would not countenance this, and one can see why; union had 
more to offer England, who saw the potential for controlling Scotland, than 
Scotland, who saw the dangers of being controlled.
Moreover, what appeared to be new common cause in religion was 
very much less than that. Although it is the case that Scotland moved away 
from Catholicism only in 1559-60, whereas England had been experiment-
ing with reform since the 1530s, there was a very considerable difference 
between the religious positions in the two countries. In the 1520s and 
1530s, Lutheran ideas had come into Scotland. From the 1540s, Scottish 
protestant s were more decisively Reformed and Calvinist than their English 
counterpart s. And when Reformation came, the nature of the reformed kirk in 
Scotland was utterly different from that of England. Any idea of royal suprem-
acy was blocked from the beginning. Visibly the Catholic Mary queen of Scot s 
could not be supreme governor of the kirk, but it was not only that. There 
was a strand in Scottish Protestant thinking which can be traced back before 
the Reformation to 1548, which insisted that church and state were sepa-
rate, and that was strenuously maintained throughout the latter half of the 
sixteenth century. It was only after half a century of struggle, in 1610, that 
James VI would finally achieve recognition as supreme governor of the kirk, 
and even then his role was distinctly less influential than that he enjoyed as 
James I. For authority in the kirk, from 1559, lay with a hierarchy of ecclesi-
astical court s, on the Genevan and French model, from the General Assembly 
at the top down to the regional and parochial synods, presbyteries (from 
1581), and kirk sessions. The Scot s regarded their reformation as purer and 
more thorough than the English, and kept saying so. In 1616, they called 
their church ‘one of the purest kirks under heaven this day’; in the Solemn 
League and Covenant of 1643, when they threw in their lot with the English 
parliamentarians against Charles I, they promised to ‘endeavour’ for ‘the 
preservation of the Reformed Religion in the Church of Scotland’, as opposed 
to ‘the Reformation of Religion in the Kingdoms of England and Ireland’14. 
And it was not just the greater purity of the Scottish kirk. True to their tradi-
tion of thinking of themselves as a European kingdom, and an important one 
at that, they saw their kirk as part of the universal Reformed church; their 
Confession of Faith of 1560 was addressed to Scotland and ‘all utheris 
Realmeis and Natiouns, professing the samyn Christ Jesus’15. The Scot s 
were certainly prepared to acknowledge England’s part in helping them to 
bring about their Reformation. But once they had done so, they displayed the 
same sense of superiority which they had shown in the political and cultural 
14. CALDERWOOD, David. The History of the Kirk of Scotland, Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 
1842-49, vii; p. 241. DICKINSON, W. Croft and DONALDSON, Gordon, eds, A Source Book of Scot-
tish History, Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, III; pp. 122-3; my italics.
15. THOMSON, Thomas; INNES, Cosmo, eds. The Act s of the Parliament s of Scotland, Edin-
burgh: 1814-75, II; p. 526. WORMALD, Jenny. Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland, 1470-1625, 
London: Edward Arnold, 1981; pp. 116; KELLAR, Clare. Scotland, England and the Reformation, 
1534-1561, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; pp. 211-2.
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spheres. Religion for the Scot s was therefore no more a basis for the British 
vision unilaterally indulged in by Elizabeth’s great minister William Cecil than 
any other consideration; Scotland remained independent and European. If 
three centuries of Anglo-Scottish history made a union of heart s and minds 
unlikely in the extreme, the much more recent advent of protestant reform 
in both kingdoms was too fragile a veneer to make a genuine union of souls 
possible.
All of this means that it is wrong to think that the old and grandiose vision 
of an English composite monarchy which incorporated Scotland, Wales and 
Ireland, and the new idea of an Anglo-Scottish protestant bulwark against the 
great Catholic powers, somehow meant that union was some kind of inevita-
ble culmination. Both old vision and new idea very much reflected the English 
view of Scotland’s place within the British Isles, and it s relationship to 
England; and, indeed, the annexation of Scotland was much less of a dream 
in the sixteenth century, except for a brief moment when it inspired Henry 
VIII, than in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, while the protestant 
bulwark could be created by an alliance. Their importance lies, however, in 
that they formed the ingrained attitudes which would underpin the approach 
and reaction to union when it came. But neither was the cause of union. 
The reason was much simpler: England needed a successor to the childless 
Elizabeth, and James VI was the successor who would avert foreign invasion 
by a French or Spanish candidate or civil war, should a domestic claimant 
make a bid for the throne. As one contemporary commentator makes clear, 
even the accession of the Scottish king caused worries. He began by stating 
emphatically that ‘this kingdome is an absolute Imperiall Monarchy’, thus 
raising a certain doubt about where James’s Scottish kingdom would fit in. 
But having listed the twelve competitors ‘that gape for the death of that good 
old Princess, the now Queen’, of whom James was the first, he then goes 
on to show that Elizabeth was still desperately trying to deny reality: many 
Englishmen, he says, knew that the throne would go to the king of Scot s, 
‘but to determyne thereof is to all English capitally forbidden, and therefore 
soe I leave it’16. The English succession had caused every-growing concern 
throughout Elizabeth’s reign. By it s last years, she was, as Wilson said, ‘the 
Eldest Prince in yeares and raygne throughout Europe or our knowne World’, 
and that was not a matter for pride but for lamentation; England was a suffer-
ing from a monarch who would neither die nor take thought for the future. It 
could do no other than face the prospect of union.
Scotland, by contrast, did not need a union. The Stuart dynasty was 
secure, for between 1594 and 1600, James had three children who survived, 
Henry, Elizabeth and Charles. James himself did not show the obsession for 
the English throne which his mother Mary had done, though he was not, of 
course, averse to acquiring another kingdom. Had the Tudor dynasty not died 
out, he would have continued to be king of Scot s, without in any sense feel-
16. FISHER, F.J.; ed., WILSON, Sir Thomas. The State of England (1600), London: Camden 
Miscellany 16, Camden Society, 1936; pp. 1, 2, 5.
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ing himself an inferior monarch; from James I in the early fifteenth century, 
none of the Stuart kings, with the exception of Mary, had done so. When 
Elizabeth at long last died in 1603, therefore, the Scot s had a king to offer, 
the English a kingdom to hand over. What an outcome of three centuries of 
determined English effort s at best to annex or at least to assert superiority 
over Scotland! And when one adds to this that most unions took place when 
a superior power took over inferior ones, this emerges as a union created in 
the most profoundly ironic of circumstances. 
No union was easy. Not surprisingly, this one was exceptionally difficult, 
for neither Scotland nor England could behave according to ‘normal’ rules. 
In time, the greater size, wealth and power of the kingdom of England would 
bring about that ‘normality’, and create a new host of problems as Scotland 
sank into the second-rate and neglected power. But that was only in the sec-
ond half of the seventeenth century. Although even in James’s reign fears 
of neglect were beginning to be voiced, king James never did in fact neglect 
his northern kingdom, and indeed benefited from the fact that most of his 
Scottish councillors were men who had worked with him in the 1590s and 
lived on through his rule from England, so that this absentee king was not a 
remote and unknown one. And king Charles I, by causing the first of his three 
collision courses in Scotland in the 1630s, so that Scotland had it s civil 
war and constitutional revolution before either the rebellion in Ireland or the 
constitutional revolution and civil war in England of the 1640s, ensured that 
the Scot s had a major role to play in the crisis of the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury. More immediately, the union in 1603 witnessed considerable jubilation 
among the Scot s, who in any case did not regard themselves as inferior, and 
frantic flurrying among the English, trying desperately to assert a superiority 
to which they felt entitled but which did not convince.
This showed up within the first weeks of James’s rule of England and 
Scotland. The English privy council, writing to him to offer him the throne 
on Elizabeth’s death on 24 March 1603, found to their astonishment that 
their new king was not so overwhelmed by his immense good fortune as 
to rush south precipitously. Even worse, for the dominant Cecilian faction 
of Elizabeth’s last years, was the discovery that the king, confident in his 
abilities, was not prepared to arrive in London under it s tutelage. And per-
haps most alarming of all was the fact that he neither knew nor cared about 
English bureaucratic procedures, for such procedures, so dear to the heart s 
of English government s, were not rated highly by Scottish ones17. James 
came to England as king, with his own style of kingship. He very quickly dou-
bled the size of the English privy council; he brought in members of the fac-
tion which had surrounded the dead earl of Essex, Robert Cecil’s great rival in 
the 1590s, and the Howards, another great family not favoured by Cecil, and 
he extended it s range to include councillors from the north and Wales. And 
17. There is a wonderful exchange of letters written between James and the English privy 
council in the weeks between his accession in march and his arrival in London in March 1603 which 
brings these point s out beautifully, in Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ashmole MS 1729, ff 39r-90v.
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he included five Scot s. He made it clear that a closer union would be a major 
business of his first parliament s; and when the English House of Commons 
denied him the title of king of Great Britain in 1604, he took it by proclama-
tion. He tried to make his court and household Anglo-Scottish, and when that 
did not work, in the privy- and bedchamber, because of Anglo-Scottish hostil-
ity, he made his bedchamber exclusively Scottish, and kept it so until 1615. 
He upset the leaders of the late Elizabethan church, archbishop John Whitgift 
and Richard Bancroft, bishop of London, by making it clear that he preferred 
the educational standards of the Scottish parish ministry to those of the 
English. 
All this made it horribly clear how misguided was the earl of Northum-
berland’s hopeful belief, expressed in a letter to the king shortly before 
the union that, despite the fears of that James, when he became king of 
England, would bring in Scot s to serve him, the king ‘will think that your 
honor in being reputed a king of england will be greatar than to be a king of 
Scottes’18. That was a blunt assertion of English superiority. Cecil and three 
of his fellow-councillors, perhaps hoping to please their new master with a 
gentler version of the same message, wrote to him on 10 April 1603, giving 
him ‘humble thanks for sending so grave and judicious a man among us as 
my lord of Kinloss [a Scot sman who had arrived ahead of James in London], 
who is already so good an Englishman’19. Trying to impose Englishness was 
one way of seeking to conceal the unpalatable fact that the English ruling 
élite was being infiltrated by Scot smen, the chief of whom was now king 
of England. More bluntly, the flattering and soothing extolling of union by 
English and Scottish poet s, Samuel Daniel, Michael Drayton, Robert Aytoun, 
Alexander Craig, was rivalled, if not drowned out, by a flood of anti-Scottish 
writing by Anthony Weldon, Francis Osborne, Geoffrey Goodman, bishop of 
Gloucester and others, all portraying the Scot s as beggarly, grasping, thiev-
ing, filthy and lice-ridden20. And Anglo-Scottish brawling, at court and in the 
street s of London, was a further reminder that union there might be, but a 
union of heart s and minds there was not. Moreover, the king’s hope of a 
union which brought the two kingdoms into closer conjunction than that which 
depended solely on the personal union of the crowns, went down to defeat in 
the English parliament s of 1604 and 1607; that would come about only after 
the trials and errors, the upset s and resentment s of the seventeenth century, 
meant that the union would either be broken or strengthened, and it was the 
latter course which was adopted in 1707. 
18. BRUCE, John, ed. Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and 
Others in England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, London: Camden Society, 1861; pp. 55-6.
19. National Archives, London, SP14/1/18, f.38r.
20. NICHOLS, John, ed. The progresses, processions and magnificent festivities of King James 
the First, 4 vols, London: 1828, I; p. 121; HEBEL, J. William. The Works of Michael Drayton, 5 
vols, Oxford, 1961, I; p. 474; GULLANS, C.B., ed. The English and Latin Poems of Sir Robert Ayton, 
Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1963; p. 24; LAING, D., ed. The Poetical Works of Alexander 
Craig of Rosecraig, Glasgow: Hunterian Club, 1873; p. 25; SCOTT, Walter. The Secret History of the 
Court of James I, 2 vols, Edinburgh: 1811, I; pp. 1-298, II, pp. 1-20; BREWER, J.S., ed., GOODMAN, 
Geoffrey. The Court of King James, London, 1839.
123Rev. int. estud. vascos. Cuad., 5, 2009, 109-124
Wormald, J.: ‘A Union of Heart s and Minds?’ The Making of the Union Between Scotland and …
Most unions of the early-modern period did not last; Poland, for example, 
retained it s late fourteenth century union with Lithuania, but those it formed 
in the sixteenth century were short-lived. The Spanish monarchia certainly 
survived, but it held onto Portugal for only sixty years, and had to struggle to 
regain Catalonia. At the other end of the spectrum, in terms of size, was the 
Anglo-Scottish union, which also lasted. Given the history of Anglo-Scottish 
relations before 1603 and England’s attempt to marginalise Scotland thereaf-
ter, it is not immediately apparent why. One reason is that which had brought 
union about in the first place: England had no acceptable alternative to the 
Stuart dynasty. Another owes much to the particular personality of James VI 
and I. James came to England as king, not English pupil. In Scotland in 1598-
99 he had written books on kingship by divine right which worried his English 
subject s, far more, interestingly enough, than they worried his Scottish 
ones, who knew his style of kingship which, in practice, was very far from 
his theory; James was neither autocratic nor absolutist21. He was, in fact, 
a shrewd, skilful and flexible politician. His juggling act, between 1603 and 
1625, was impressive. He began by reassuring his Scottish subject s, whom 
he had left, by making it clear that he would not subscribe to English desires 
that he should forget them, but was fighting to retain their equal status. Later 
in his reign, he began to make similarly reassuring comment s to his English 
ones. In 1616, for example, in his speech to Star Chamber, he went back on 
his earlier and frightening intention of trying to unify the laws of England and 
Scotland, which caused huge offence to English lawyers with their intense 
pride in English law; now, this was restated as ‘my desire was to conforme 
the Lawes of Scotland to the Law of England’, and he even referred to 
England as ‘the greater kingdom’, tactfully quoting his ancestor Henry VII, 
who had prophecied that the marriage of his daughter Margaret to James IV 
of Scotland might in time bring about union, in which the greater would draw 
the lesser kingdom to it22.
The union of 1603 had in fact meant that the lesser had drawn the 
greater. Paradoxically, that was in it self a source of strength. For the twenty-
three years of James’s reign as king of Scotland and England gave time for 
the Scot s to realize that they, who had never needed the union as England 
did, had not lost out by it. The English, while perplexed by their king’s deter-
mined and continued interest in his northern kingdom, could take comfort 
from the fact that his heir Charles had been brought up in England, and 
would, presumably, be much more clearly an English king. As it happened, 
they were wrong. Unfortunately for Charles, he retained an interest in 
Scotland, but so clumsy and insensitive was it that he brought about open 
conflict between himself and his Scottish subject s, while his worried English 
ones in the 1630s had no answer as to how to deal with the unacceptable 
21. CRAIGIE, J., ed. The Basilikon Doron of King James VI, 2 vols, Edinburgh: Scottish Text 
Society, 1944-50; CRAIGIE, J.; LAW, A. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies in The Minor Prose Works 
of King James VI and I, Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982.
22. McILWAIN, C.H., ed. The Political Works of James I, reprint, New York: Russell and Rus-
sell, 1965; p. 329.
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nature of his kingship. Here was another irony; his Scottish and English oppo-
nent s now found common cause, something to bring them together. And so 
the union lurched on, until, a century after it s inception, it was transformed 
into what James had wanted, the union of Great Britain. The reasons for that 
were many and complex. But two factors may be mentioned here. First, the 
union begun by king James VI and I had been in existence for long enough for 
men to become accustomed to it, regard it as the political reality. Second, 
the dynastic consideration which had begun it all still held good. In 1707, 
there was no realistic alternative successor to the last Stuart monarch, the 
childless queen Anne, for either England or Scotland, than the Hanoverian 
protestant descendant of king James.
